#### SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

JUSTICE CENTER: Central Justice Center Civil Operations - Appellate Division 700 Civic Center Dr. West Santa Ana. CA 92701 FLED
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE
CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

MAY 25 2010

APPELLANT: Khaled

ALAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Court

RESPONDENT: People

J. GOMEZ\_\_\_\_DEPUTY

NOTICE OF FILING OF JUDGMENT/ORDER

Appellate Division

APPEAL CASE NUMBER: **30-2009-00304893** 

TRIAL COURT CASE NUMBER:

SA128676PE

To the above named parties and their attorneys of record:

You are notified that a Judgment in the above entitled matter was filed on: May 21, 2010

A Copy of the **Judgment** is attached for reference.

#### CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

R. Allen Baylis 9042 Garfiled Ave. #306 Huntington Beach, CA 92646 By Interoffice Delivery:

Central Justice Center - Traffic -

Hon. Daniel Ornelas, Commissioner - C/O JAG

Hon. Erick L. Larsh - Supervising Judge - Dept. C55

Anthony Rackauckas O.C. District Attorney P.O. Box 808 Santa Ana, CA 92701

I certify that I am not a party to this action and that this certificate was mailed in accordance with Section 1013a of the Code of Civil Procedure. A copy of this Notice of Filing of Judgment/Order with a copy of the Judgment/Order and Minute Order dated 5/25/10 were deposited in the United States mail, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid addressed as shown above. The mailing and this certification occurred at Santa Ana, California, on May 25, 2010

ALAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Court

**JORGE GOMEZ** 

J. Gomez, Deputy Clerk



#### CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

MAY 2 1 2010

## APPELLATE DIVISION

ALAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF ORANGE

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.

KHALED,

Defendant and
Appellant.

JUDGMENT ON APPEAL from the SUPERIOR COURT of ORANGE COUNTY

CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

CASE NO. 30-2009-304893

HON. DANIEL M. ORNELAS COMMISSIONER

This appeal involves an issue far too often presented to this court, namely the admissibility of evidence and the statutory compliance with the procedures employed by several municipalities in this county in what have come to be known as "photo enforcement" citations.

On August 2, 2008, the police department of the City of Santa Ana issued a traffic citation to the appellant alleging a violation of California Vehicle Code section 21453, subdivision (a). A traffic trial was held on the matter. The prosecution sought to establish the majority of the violation with a declaration that was intended to support the introduction of photographs purporting to show the appellant driving through an intersection against a red light. Appellant objected to the

introduction of the photographs and declaration as inadmissible hearsay, and violative of appellant's confrontation rights. The objection was overruled and the trial judge admitted the photographs as business records, official records, and because a proper foundation for the admission had been made based on the submitted declaration.

We hold that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs and the accompanying declaration over the appellant's hearsay and confrontation clause objections. Absent the photographs and content in the declaration, there is insufficient evidence to support the violation. Accordingly we reverse the judgment.1

# I. Factual Summary

The underlying facts in this case are fairly simple. No police officer witnessed the alleged traffic violation.

Instead, a police officer testified about the general area depicted in a photograph taken from a camera installed at an intersection in Santa Ana. A particular private company contracts with the municipality to install, maintain, and store this digital photographic information. The officer testified these photographs are then periodically sent back to the police department for review as possible driving violations.

<sup>1</sup> Appellant and real party in interest, the City of Santa Ana address issues regarding the prosecution of photo-enforcement cases in general and the lack of notice in this case, that we find unnecessary to address in light of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's finding.

26

27

28

To be more specific, the photographs contain hearsay evidence concerning the matters depicted in the photograph including the date, time, and other information. The person who entered that relevant information into the camera-computer system did not testify. The person who entered that information was not subject to being cross-examined on the underlying source of that The person or persons who maintain the system did information. not testify. No one with personal knowledge testified about how often the system is maintained. No one with personal knowledge testified about how often the date and time are verified or The custodian of records for the company that contracts with the city to maintain, monitor, store, and The person with disperse these photographs did not testify. direct knowledge of the workings of the camera-computer system did not testify. Instead, the prosecution chose to submit the testimony of a local police officer, Santa Ana Police Officer This witness testified that sometime in the distant Alan Berg. past, he attended a training session where he was instructed on the overall working of the system at the time of the training (See Settled Statement, page 1, lines 24-26 (hereafter SS 1:24-Officer Berg was unable to testify about the specific procedure for the programming and storage of the system information.

# A. Admissibility of videotape and photographic evidence:

These photo enforcement cases present a unique factual situation to the courts regarding the admissibility of videotapes and photographs. There are two types of situations where a videotape or photographs are typically admitted into evidence where the photographer or videographer does not testify. The first involves a surveillance camera at a commercial establishment (often times a bank or convenienceliquor store). In those situations, a person testifies to being in the building and recounts the events depicted in the photographs. Courts have consistently held that such testimony establishes a sufficient foundation if the videotape is a "reasonable representation of what it is alleged to portray." (See generally People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 932, 952-953, People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 312, 385-387; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 668, 745-747; Imwinkelried, California Evidentiary Foundations, p. 115, 117 (3rd ed. 2000); also United States v. Jernigan (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 1050 (en banc).)

The second situation involves what is commonly known as a "nanny cam." In that situation, a homeowner hides a surveillance camera in a room and then retrieves the camera at a later time. At the court proceeding, that person establishes the time and placement of the camera. This person also has

3

1

2

5

7

9 10

11 12

13

15

16

17 18

19

20

22

24

25 26

27

28

personal knowledge of when the camera was initially started and when it was eventually stopped and retrieved.

Neither of these situations is analogous to the situation at bar. Here the officer could not establish the time in question, the method of retrieval of the photographs, or that any of the photographs or the videotape was a "reasonable representation of what it is alleged to portray." A very analogous situation to the case at bar, however, is found in Ashford v. Culver City Unified Sch. Dist. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 344, 349-450, where the court held that the unauthenticated videotape allegedly showing employee's actions lacked sufficient foundation to be admitted at an administrative hearing. And in so holding the court noted that without establishing such a foundation, the videotape was inadmissible.

## B. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule are not applicable here.

In lieu of establishing the necessary foundation by direct testimony, the proponent of the evidence, respondent, argues that independent hearsay exceptions justify admission of the photographs under either the "Official Records Exception" or the "Business Records Exception" of the Evidence Code.2 Neither of these sections support Respondent's contention. We recognize that the trial court is vested with "wide discretion" in determining whether sufficient foundation is laid to qualify evidence under these hearsay exceptions. And "[o]n appeal,

<sup>2</sup> Appellant's Opening Brief, pages 5-7; Respondent's Opening Brief, pages 8-10.

exercise of that discretion can be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse." <a href="People">People</a> v. <a href="Beeler">Beeler</a> (1995) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 953, 978-979.

# 1. Official Records Exception (Evid. Code, § 1280).

The prosecution argues that these documents were properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1280, the "Official Records" exception to the hearsay rule.3 A plain reading of this section cannot support their position. Not only does this section require that the writing be "made by … a public employee (subd. (a)) (e.g., Shea v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1998) 62 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1057 (forensic laboratory trainee did not qualify as a "public employee")), but the public employee must be under a legal duty to make such reports (subd. (a); e.g., People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 41, 158-159 (autopsy report originally performed and prepared by now deceased coroner properly admitted through testimony of another coroner).

Here, the signator of the document, Exhibit #3, states they are employees of the "Redlex Traffic Systems." At no point does the signatory state that "Redflex Traffic Systems" is a public entity or that they are otherwise employed by a public entity.

<sup>3</sup> Section 1280 provides: "Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition, or event if all of the following applies:

<sup>(</sup>a) The writing was made by and within the scope or duty of a public employee.

<sup>(</sup>b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition or event.

<sup>(</sup>c) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such to indicate its trustworthiness."

Absent this critical foundation information, the document that they created cannot be and is not an "official record" under Evidence Code section 1280.

In addition, section 1280 requires that "[t]he sources of information and method and time of preparation [of the record] were such as to indicate its trustworthiness" (subd. (c)).

Except for the written content of Exhibit #3, which presents another layer of hearsay, there is a total lack of evidence to establish this element of section 1280 hearsay exception. Each layer of hearsay must meet the foundational elements of this exception or another hearsay exception, or the writing is inadmissible. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 224-225 ("As with all multiple hearsay, the question is whether each hearsay statement fell within an exception to the hearsay rule."),

People v. Ayers (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 988,995; People v. Baeske (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 775 (police report containing contents of phone call to police department inadmissible under official record exception).)

However, section 1280 does permit the court to admit an official record or report without necessarily requiring a witness to testify as to its identity and mode of preparation if the court takes judicial notice or if sufficient independent evidence shows that the record or report was prepared in such a manner to assure its trustworthiness. (Bhatt v. State Dept. of

Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 923, 929 [citations omitted].)

Here, the record is totally silent as to whether the trial court took judicial notice of anything, nor does it show "sufficient independent evidence ... that the record or report was prepared in such a manner to assure its trustworthiness." The only evidence, outside of the contents of Exhibit #3, describing the workings of the photo enforcement system and recordation of information from that system came from Officer Berg who, admittedly, was unable to testify about the specific procedure from the programming and store of the system information (SS 1:24-26). Consequently, the trial court erred in admitting this evidence as an official record.

# 2. Business Records Exception (Evid. Code, § 1271).

These exhibits also do not fall under the business record exception under section 1271.4 In order to establish the proper foundation for the admission of a business record, an appropriate witness must be called to lay that foundation (Bhatt, supra). The underlying purpose of section 1270 is to eliminate the necessity of calling all witnesses who were

<sup>4 &</sup>quot;Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if:

<sup>(</sup>a) The writing was made in the regular course of a business;

<sup>(</sup>b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition or event;

<sup>(</sup>c) The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation;

<sup>(</sup>d) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate it trustworthiness."

involved in a transaction or event (<u>People v. Crosslin</u> (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 968). Generally, the witness who attempts to lay the foundation is a custodian, but any witness with the requisite firsthand knowledge of the business's record-keeping procedures may qualify. The proponent of the admission of the documents has the burden of establishing the requirements for admission and the trustworthiness of the information. (<u>People v. Beeler</u>, <u>supra</u>, 9 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at p. 978.) And the document cannot be prepared in contemplation of litigation. (<u>Palmer v. Hoffman</u> (1943) 318 U.S. 109; <u>Gee v. Timineri</u> (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 139.)

Here, Officer Berg did not qualify as the appropriate witness and did not have the necessary knowledge of underlying workings, maintenance, or record keeping of Redflex Traffic System. The foundation for the introduction of the photographs and the underlying working of the Redflex Traffic System was outside the personal knowledge of Officer Berg. If the evidence fails to establish each foundational fact, neither hearsay exception is available (People v. Matthews (1991) 229 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 930, 940).5

Accordingly, without such foundation, the admission of Exhibits #1 and 3 was erroneous and thus the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these exhibits. Without these

<sup>5</sup> This is not a situation where, in compliance with a lawfully issued subpoena duces tecum, the custodian submitted a declaration attesting to the necessary foundation facts (Evid. Code, § 1560 et. seq.). See also  $\underline{\text{Taggart}}$  v. Super Seer Corp. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1697. No such subpoena duces tecum was issued or introduced here.

documents, there is a total lack of evidence to support the vehicle code violation in question.

The judgment is reversed and with directions that the charge be dismissed (People v. Bighinatti (1975) 55 Cal.App.3d Supp. 5, 7).

GREGG L.PRICKETT, Acting Presiding Judge\*

GREGORY H. LEWIS,

Judge

MAREN L. ROBINSON,

Judge

\* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the California

Supreme Court.

#### SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

#### MINUTE ORDER

Date: 05/25/2010

Time: 08:36:00 AM

Dept:

Judicial Officer Presiding: Appellate Panel

Clerk: Jorge A Gomez

Reporter/ERM:

Bailiff/Court Attendant:

Case No: 30-2009-00304893-CL-MC-CJC Case Init. Date: 09/23/2009

Case Title: People of the State of California vs. Khaled

Case Category: Civil - Limited

Case Type: Misc Complaints - Other

#### **APPEARANCES**

## Appellate Panel Judge(s):

Honorable Gregg L. Prickett, Assistant Presiding Judge Honorable Gregory H. Lewis, Judge Honorable Karen L. Robinson, Judge

Trial Court Case Number: SA128676PE

The court having reviewed and considered the matter finds the opinion meets the standards for certification for publication set forth in CRC Rule 8.1105(c)(2) and (c)(6). It applies existing rules governing the admissibility of evidence to the specific context of citations issued through an automated enforcement system. We are aware of no prior published authority which addresses specifically the requirements for admission of evidence in this context. The opinion addresses an issue of "continuing public interest," in that use of automated enforcement systems has become increasingly common in Orange County and throughout California. Published guidance on the admissibility of evidence in these cases is essential to trial courts hearing the cases, as well as law enforcement, municipalities employing automated enforcement systems and the motoring public. The opinion is therefore certified for publication.

Date: 05/25/2010 MINUTE ORDER Page: 1
Dept: Calendar No.: